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INTRODUCTION 
Transportation Alliance Bank ("TAB") filed suit against Defendants, 
International Confections Company, NG Acquisition, and Michael Ryan, 
and requested the immediate appointment of a receiver to preserve assets 
that served as collateral for TAB's loan to Defendants. Bank of American 
Fork and other creditors intervened to support the appointment of a 
receiver and protect their interest in the collateral. In what is a recurring 
pattern in this case, Defendants stipulated to the intervention, but now 
argue that the district court erred by allowing intervention. 
After a receiver had been appointed and the intervenors had entered 
the case, TAB sought to unilaterally dismiss the entire case, thereby 
terminating the receivership. Intervenors objected. Defendants then 
stipulated that the receivership would remain in place, that the intervenors 
could continue pursuing recovery from the receivership estate, and that the 
receiver could continue to pursue a sale of the receivership assets - many 
of which were perishable assets (chocolate, candy, confections, trail mix, 
and other perishable products) that had to be sold quickly or would be lost. 
v 
But Defendants now claim that the district court erred by leaving the 
receivership in place and allowing the case to move forward. 
Defendants not only stipulated to the receivership continuing, they 
praised the receiver for his good work and pre-approved a sale of the 
receivership assets based on a pending offer, noting that they would also 
approve any "better offer" that came along. Having approved an 
acceptable offer, Defendants seemed to have no interest in the details. Just 
a few days later, even with an offer pending and time being of the essence, 
Defendants stipulated to their attorney withdrawing. 
Their attorney attempted to withdraw (his notice of withdrawal was 
defective) on the same day the receiver filed a motion seeking expedited 
approval of a significantly better offer he had received. A hearing was held 
on the expedited motion. Defendants were aware of the hearing because 
their purportedly withdrawn attorney continued to receive all notices and 
the receiver had specifically notified Mr. Ryan about the hearing. But 
Defendants chose not to appear. To be sure, Defendants might have 
assumed that their attorney had properly withdrawn and that International 
Confections and NG Acquisition could not appear without an attorney, but 
Vl 
Mr. Ryan could have appeared on his own behalf and asked for time to 
retain a new attorney for his companies. But the reality is, Defendants 
obviously didn't care enough about the details to be concerned about the 
pending sale. They made absolutely no effort and showed no concern 
about the sale - at least there is nothing in the record. The evidence 
suggests that Defendants were simply content to let the sale move forward 
in their absence. At the hearing, the receiver told the court that the offer 
was for nearly $1 million more than the previous offer and that time was of 
the essence because inventory was perishing and workers were leaving. 
The court approved the sale. 
Defendants accepted the benefits of the sale while remaining silent. 
It was not until months later when a minor detail of the sale-some 
standard release language- came back to bite them that Defendants 
objected. As the district court found, "Defendants did not have any 
objection to the sale of the assets to Mrs. Fields until they were confronted 
with the release language ... months later," a detail of the sale they did not 
bother to concern themselves with. (R.1455.) In essence, Defendants 
stipulated to the sale-not expressly as with their stipulation to 
Vll 
intervention, their stipulation to the receivership continuing, and their 
stipulation to their attorney withdrawing- but by remaining silent while 
the sale went forward. Now, they contend that the court erred by 
approving the sale. 
The district court did not err in any aspect of this case. It did not lose 
jurisdiction when TAB attempted to unilaterally dismiss the entire case 
under Rule 41(a)(1). That rule was inapplicable because (1) Defendants 
had responded to the complaint by opposing the appointment of a receiver 
and allowing intervention; (2) the appointment of a receiver meant that 
only the court could dismiss the case and terminate the receivership; and 
(3) after intervention, TAB was not the only plaintiff in the case and could 
not dismiss the claims of the intervenors. The district court had jurisdiction 
and correctly concluded that the judgment was not void. 
The district court's rejection of Defendants' other arguments is 
subject to an abuse of discretion standard. And the district court plainly 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendants failed to establish 
"excusable neglect" or any other "reason justifying relief from the 
judgment." Finally, even if Defendants could establish grounds under 
Vlll 
Rule 60 for reversal, they would also have to show that they had a 
"meritorious defense" that they would have raised. The district court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendants did not have a 
meritorious defense. Defendants' "defense" is an unmeritorious objection 
to a single provision in an otherwise unobjectionable offer. Not only 
unobjectionable, but an offer that was for far more money than any other 
offer the receiver received. 
The district court did not commit reversible error. Bank of American 
Fork asks this Court to affirm. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction exists under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: TAB filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal after (1) 
Defendants had responded to the complaint by opposing the appointment 
of a receiver, (2) a receiver had been appointed and, (3) several additional 
parties (secured creditors) had intervened. After the Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal was filed, Defendants stipulated that the receivership would 
remain open and that the intervenors could continue as plaintiffs under the 
IX 
original complaint filed by TAB. Did the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal 
deprive the district court of jurisdiction? 
Standard of Review: "A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment 
under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion," but 
when the motion is based on lack of jurisdiction, it "becomes a question of 
law upon which we do not defer to the district court." State Dept. of Social 
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
Issue 2: Defendants contend that the attempted withdrawal of their 
counsel and the failure of the other parties to send a notice to appear or 
appoint counsel as required by Rule 74(c) constitutes a "reason justifying 
relief from the judgment" under 60(b)(6). The district court rejected this 
argument because the notice of withdrawal was defective; Defendants 
continued to receive notice of pleadings and hearings and yet took no 
action; Defendants were aware of and accepted the benefits of the sale to 
Mrs. Fields; and the district court would have approved the sale even if 
Defendants had objected. Did the district court abuse its discretion by 
denying Defendants motion to set aside the judgment based on the 
withdrawal of Defendants' counsel? 
x 
Standard of Review: "The district court judge is vested with 
considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion 
to set aside a judgment." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). "A 
district court abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the 
logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock 
one's sense of justice ... or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v. 
Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, if 27 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Issue 3: Defendants contend that the judgment should be set aside 
under Rule 60(b)(1) because their failure to object to the Sale Order was the 
result of "excusable neglect." The district court determined that 
Defendants neglect was not excusable because Defendants were aware of 
the receivership, aware of pending offers, aware that time was of the 
essence, and had both actual notice and notice through their counsel of the 
hearing at which the sale was approved. The evidence shows that 
Defendants simply chose not to object to the sale to Mrs. Fields and were 
unconcerned until they learned about a single provision in the sale 
agreement. The district court also found that even if Defendants had 
Xl 
objected, they did not have a meritorious defense. Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment based on 
excusable neglect? 
Standard of Review: "The district court judge is vested with 
considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion 
to set aside a judgment." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). /1 A 
district court abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the 
logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock 
one's sense of justice ... or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v. 
Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, ,-r 27 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This case is a dispute between a creditor, 
Transportation Alliance Bank ("TAB"), and its debtors, International 
Confections Company, LLC and NG Acquisition, LLC, (the "Companies"), 
and Michael D. Ryan. (R.1-234.) After TAB filed its complaint, several 
additional creditors intervened: Back Bay Investments, LC; Dynamic 
Confections, Inc.; Wasatch Peak Holdings, LLC; Arcadia Holdings, LLC; 
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and Bank of American Fork (collectively the "Intervenors"). (R.422-30.) A 
receiver was appointed and given control of the Companies. (R.663-76.) 
Their assets were sold to Mrs. Fields. (R.928-32.) After the sale of the 
assets and the discharge of the receiver, Defendants moved to set aside the 
district court's approval of the sale under Rule 60(b). (R.1016-32.) The 
district court denied their motion. (R.1451-59.) This appeal followed. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: TAB' s complaint 
was filed on October 21, 2014. (R.1-20.) TAB's third cause of action sought 
the appointment of a receiver. (R.12-13.) TAB requested the immediate 
appointment of a receiver to conserve the collateral that secured 
Defendants' debt. (R.0238-41.) Defendants appeared through counsel, 
Mark James, and opposed the appointment of a receiver. (R.392, R.662.) 
Defendants stipulated to the Intervenors becoming parties to the case. 
(R.422-24; R.429-30.) 
The court granted the motion to appoint a receiver and gave the 
receiver control over the Companies. (R.663-76.) Shortly thereafter, TAB 
filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. (R.720.) The receiver and the 
Intervenors objected. (R.726-28; 734-37.) The district court held a hearing 
Xlll 
at which Defendants stipulated that TAB's claims would be dismissed, but 
the receivership would remain in place, the Intervenors would continue as 
plaintiffs under the third cause of action in TAB' s complaint, and the 
receiver could continue to pursue a sale of the Companies' assets. (R.1452-
53.) 
On December 17, 2014, the receiver accepted an offer to sell the 
Companies' assets to Mrs. Fields and signed an Asset Purchase Agreement, 
pending approval by the court. (R.798-800.) The next day, the receiver 
filed an Expedited Motion for Order of Sale of Receivership Assets and 
Related Issues ("Expedited Motion"). (R.792-93.) That same day, 
Defendants' counsel, Mr. James, filed a Notice of Withdrawal. (R.787-89.) 
A hearing was held on December 23, 2014, at which Defendants did not 
appear. (R.926-27.) That same day the court entered an Order Granting 
Expedited Motion for Sale of Receivership Assets and Approving the Sale 
of the Assets Free and Clear of all Encumbrances ("Sale Order"). (R.928-
32.) It is undisputed that the Sale Order was served on Defendants' 
counsel. (R.935-37.) 
XIV 
On January 23, 2015, the court entered the Order on Motion to 
Approve Receiver's Final Report and Accounting, Discharge Receiver, and 
Close Estate-the final order closing the case. (R.1009-12.) Two months 
later, March 23, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment 
and Supporting Memorandum. (R.1016-32.) Defendants asked the court to 
"reactivate the case and allow Defendants to file objections to the 
Receiver's December 18, 2014 Expedited Motion .... " (R.1016.) 
In a careful and thorough Ruling and Order issued on August 21, 
2015, which followed a lengthy hearing, Judge Laura Scott denied 
Defendants' motion. (R.1450-59.) Defendants filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R.1461-63.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 21, 2014, Plaintiff Transportation Alliance Bank ("TAB") 
filed suit against International Confections Company, NG Acquisitions (the 
"Companies"), and Michael D. Ryan (collectively "Defendants"), for breach 
of certain loan agreements and other related causes of action. (R.1-20.) 
TAB' s third cause of action sought the appointment of a receiver to take 
control of the Companies. (R.12-13.) On October 24, 2014, to avoid the loss 
xv 
of certain collateral that secured TAB's loan to Defendants, TAB filed a 
Motion for Immediate Appointment of Receiver. (R.238-41.) 
On November 4, 2014, Mark James of Hatch, James & Dodge, 
appeared as counsel for Defendants. (R.392.) A day later, TAB and 
Defendants stipulated to Bank of American Fork and several other of 
Defendants' secured creditors intervening as a matter of right under Rule 
24(a).1 (R.422-24.) The court granted the motion, declaring that the 
intervenors "are hereby deemed parties for all purposes." (R.429-30.) That 
same day, the court issued an interim order that immediately appointed a 
receiver. (R.432-36.) Nine days later, after a hearing, the court made the 
appointment of the receiver permanent. (R.663-76.) 
The receiver was instructed by the court to "immediately have and 
take possession, custody, and control of the business and all of the assets of 
1 Rule 24(a) provides: "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted 
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair 
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest 
is adequately represented by existing parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a). 
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... the Companies .... " (R.664.) Among other things, the Receiver was 
given authority to" sell, transfer, and liquidate the Assets .... " (R.664-65.) 
Shortly thereafter, TAB filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with 
Prejudice, which purported to "voluntarily dismiss[ ] this action against 
Defendants .... " (R.720.) The notice made no mention of the receiver or the 
Intervenors. Bank of American Fork filed an objection the next day. 
(R.726-28.) Bank of American Fork pointed out that Rule 41(a) does not 
allow dismissal where: (1) a receiver has been appointed and the court has 
entered an order specifying the conditions under which the receiver could 
be relieved of his duties, (2) dismissal would not be in the best interest of 
the receivership estate, (3) creditors with an interest in the receivership 
estate have been allowed to intervene by stipulation of the parties; and (4) 
Defendants have made substantive filings in the case. (R.726-28.) Another 
intervenor also objected and added additional reasons why unilateral 
voluntary dismissal should not be allowed under Rule 41(a). (R.734-37.) 
Defendants filed their reply to these objections the next day. (R.750-54.) 
The court held a hearing on the matter on December 3, 2014, at which 
Defendants appeared through their attorney, Mark James. (R.765.) At that 
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hearing, Defendants stipulated that the Intervenors would continue as 
plaintiffs, the receiver would remain in place, and the Companies' assets 
could be sold. Defendants' counsel told the court: 
What we have resolved - and what the motion - the 
objection to the dismissal revolved around was whether that 
would mean the receiver does or does not stay in place. The 
agreement we've reached is this: that Mr. Goates [the receiver], 
will stay in place, that my clients [Defendants] will support the 
sell [sic] of the assets at issue to a third party who has made an 
offer, a third party named BBX. Or if Mr. Goates receives a 
better offer from another third party, my client will support 
that. Otherwise, the parties reserve all other rights. 
(R.1452.) 
The court asked Defendants' counsel specifically what the parties' 
agreement does to the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal and whether the 
"motion to dismiss will take care of TAB but not the Intervenors." (R.1452.) 
Defendants' counsel responded that the case would remain pending with 
respect to the Intervenors: 
I think that we would stipulate . . . that the case is 
dismissed as with respect to the causes of action filed by TAB. 
We would agree that for purposes of the receivership the case 
can remain open as to the other intervening creditors .... As a 
XV Ill 
result of the good work by Mr. Goates. He's convinced us all 
he can do his job. 
(R.1453.) 
The court signed an order on December 11, 2014, that had been 
approved by Defendants which stated: "The intervening creditors in this 
case are substituted as plaintiffs under the third cause of action in the 
complaint only, and the case shall remain pending .... The November 11, 
2014 Order Approving the Immediate Appointment of Receiver ... remains 
in full force and effect." (R.780.) 
The receiver had already received one offer - from BBX Sweet 
Holdings. (R.798.) As noted, at the hearing on December 3, 2014, 
Defendants' counsel said Defendants "will support" a sale to BBX or any 
other "better offer." (R.1452.) A second offer soon came from Mrs. Fields 
Confections, LLC. (R.00798.) This offer was "nearly a million dollar 
increase" over the BBX offer. (R.1501.) In accordance with Defendants' 
stipulation, the receiver accepted the better offer from Mrs. Fields and on 
December 17, 2014, signed an Asset Purchase Agreement on behalf of the 
Companies. (R.798-800.) 
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The next day, December 18, 2014, the receiver filed an Expedited 
Motion for Order of Sale of Receivership Assets and Related Issues 
("Expedited Motion"). (R.792-93.) The accompanying memorandum 
identified Mrs. Fields as the buyer and stated that a copy of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement would be provided upon request. (R.798.) The 
memorandum also summarized the terms of the agreement and explained 
that the Assets were encumbered by more than $3 million in secured debt; 
that Mrs. Fields had agreed to pay $2.15 million; and that this was "the 
highest and best offer he believes he could receive." (R.799, R.801.) The 
Asset Purchase Agreement contained a standard release provision: 
Effective upon the Closing of the sale that is the subject of this 
Agreement, Seller on his own behalf and on behalf of the 
Companies waives and releases any and all claims he or the 
Companies may have against the Buyer and its employees, 
officers, directors, members, affiliates, and agents except for 
claims arising under this Agreement. 
(R.897.) 
The Notice of Hearing that accompanied the Expedited Motion stated 
that objections must be filed by December 22, 2014, and that a hearing 
would be held on the Expedited Motion on December 23, 2014. (R.884-86.) 
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The same day the Expedited Motion and Notice of Hearing was filed, 
Defendants' counsel, Mark James, filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. 
(R.787-89.) The Notice of Withdrawal did not contain Defendants' current 
address, as required by Rule 74. (R.787-88.) It also does not state that no 
motions were pending, which Rule 74 also requires. (R.787-88.) The Notice 
of Withdrawal was filed at 2:42 p.m. (R.790.) Nothing in the record 
indicates precisely when the Expedited Motion was filed. The district court 
explained: "Although it is unclear which was filed first, the 
contemporaneous filing of the Motion to Expedite resulted in a pending 
motion that precluded counsel for Defendants from withdrawing without 
an order from the Court." (R.1456.) What is undisputed is that Defendants 
were aware of the receiver's efforts to market the Companies' assets and 
that an offer from BBX was pending- an offer Defendants had approved. 
It is also undisputed that Defendants' counsel received notice of the 
Expedited Motion and the Notice of Hearing, and therefore became aware 
that the receiver had accepted an offer from Mrs. Fields on the same day he 
attempted to withdraw. (R.888-89.) 
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On December 22, 2014, the receiver filed a proposed Order Granting 
Expedited Motion with the Asset Purchase Agreement attached. (R.917-
21.) Defendants' counsel received this proposed order. (R.922-25.) A 
hearing was held on December 23, 2014. (R.00926-27.) Defendants 
received notice but did not respond to the Expedited Motion or appear at 
the hearing. (R.926; R.1499-1500.) Counsel for the receiver also told the 
district court that Mr. Ryan has "been in communication with the receiver 
... so he does know that this was coming down today." (R.1500.) Having 
learned that Defendants were aware of the hearing and had chosen not to 
appear, the district court proceeded. (R.1499-1500.) 
The receiver explained at the hearing the need for haste: 
[W]e have a little bit of a melting ice cube issue here. The 
inventory is aging. It's seasonal. Employees are out of work. 
There's a concern that to get the most value from this company 
we do need to strike quickly to preserve the possibility of the 
employees coming back to work for the purchaser and the 
assets becoming productive once again. 
(R.1502.) 
Because of the need for speed, at the receiver's request the court 
entered the Sale Order that same day approving the sale. (R.928-32; 
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R.1503.) It is undisputed that the Sale Order was served on Defendants' 
counsel. (R.935-37.) 
The receiver's final accounting was submitted to the court on January 
7, 2015, along with a notice of hearing. (R.963; R.967-73.) On January 23, 
2015, the court entered approved the receiver's final report, authorized 
payment of his fees, and closed the estate- effectively ending the case. 
(R.1009-11.) It is undisputed that Defendants' counsel continued to receive 
notice of all filings in the case until the very end. (R.966; 1006-08; 1012-15.) 
On March 9, 2015, Defendants filed a complaint against Mrs. Fields 
Franchising, an affiliate of Mrs. Fields Confections (the purchaser) in the 
Southern District of Ohio alleging the unlawful termination of a licensing 
agreement. (R.1039-48.) Although Defendants' counsel had purportedly 
withdrawn from this case, Defendants' allegations in their lawsuit against 
Mrs. Fields make it clear that they continued to track this case and were 
aware of the sale to Mrs. Fields. Defendants' complaint in their lawsuit 
against Mrs. Fields Franchising alleged: 
31. Mrs. Fields ... knew that International Confections 
was expanding its business and had a line of credit with TAB 
Bank. Mrs. Fields . . . falsely notified TAB Bank that 
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International Confections had defaulted under the License 
Agreement, despite having no duty to notify TAB Bank of any 
alleged default. 
32. As a result, TAB Bank petitioned to have 
International Confections taken into receivership in Utah. A 
receivership proceeding was opened. 
33. Although International Confections was able to 
reach a resolution with and pay TAB Bank, another creditor 
[the Intervenors] of International Confections called its loan. 
34. While International Confections had been 
effectively able to manage debt, it could not afford to pay all of 
its outstanding loan[s] at one time. Accordingly, the receiver 
put International Confections' assets up for sale. 
35. Mrs. Fields' Confections, LLC, an affiliate of Mrs. 
Fields Franchising, purchased International Confections' assets 
through the receivership sale. 
36. The defendants' actions have prevented 
International Confections from continuing its business 
operations, resulting in the loss of tens of millions of dollars in 
profits. 
(R.1045-46.) 
In response to the lawsuit, counsel for Mrs. Fields Franchising 
provided Defendants with a copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement and 
claimed that the release provision barred Defendants' claim. (R.1035-36.) 
Defendants dismissed their lawsuit against Mrs. Fields Franchising. 
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On March 23, 2015, Defendants filed, in this case, a Motion for Relief 
from Judgment and Supporting Memorandum. (R.1016-32.) Defendants 
asked the court to "reactivate the case and allow Defendants to file 
objections to the Receiver's December 18, 2014 Expedited Motion .... " 
(R.1016.) In a careful and thorough Ruling and Order issued on August 21, 
2015, which followed a lengthy hearing, Judge Laura Scott denied 
Defendants' motion. (R.1450-59.) Defendants filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R.1461-63.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The judgment is not void. Defendants first contend that the 
judgment is void because the district court lost jurisdiction when TAB filed 
its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, and should therefore be set aside under 
Rule 60(b)(4). TAB's attempted dismissal did not deprive the district court 
of jurisdiction for at least three reasons: First, Defendants had filed a 
"response" to the complaint, which is all Rule 41(a)(1) requires, meaning 
TAB could not withdraw without an order from the court. Second, the 
appointment of a receiver meant that the case could not be dismissed 
without an order from the court. Utah law makes clear that the court, not 
the parties, controls the discharge of a receiver. Third, a plaintiff cannot 
unilaterally dismiss if there are other plaintiffs in the case, and the 
Intervenors were plaintiffs in this case. With Defendants stipulation and 
approval, Intervenors were expressly recognized as plaintiffs and adopted 
TAB' s pleading. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded 
that the attempted withdrawal of Defendants' counsel is not a "reason 
justifying relief from the judgment." Defendants second argument is that 
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a moratorium should have been imposed when their attorney attempted to 
withdraw and that the failure of the remaining parties to serve a notice on 
Defendants to appear or appoint counsel is a "reason justifying relief from 
the judgment" under Rule 60(b)(6). The Notice of Withdrawal was 
defective because it did not contain a forwarding address for Defendants 
and failed to state whether there were any motions pending. It is 
undisputed that Defendants' counsel continued to receive notice of all 
motions and hearings. Additionally, the moratorium is not unbreakable -
a court can set aside the moratorium and move forward if necessary. In 
this case, the receiver presented the best offer he was going to receive, 
Defendants had pre-approved the sale, and the sale had to happen quickly. 
Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it refused to set aside the judgment because of the attempted 
withdrawal of Defendants' counsel. 
The district court's conclusion that Defendants did not exercise 
"excusable neglect" was not an abuse of discretion. Defendants third 
argument is that their failure to object to the Sale Order was the result of 
"excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(l). The Defendants have to show that 
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they exercised due diligence under the circumstances. There is no evidence 
in the record that Defendants exercised any diligence, especially under 
these circumstances. Defendants were aware that the receiver had received 
an offer and was actively trying to sell the property. Defendants knew that 
a sale needed to happen quickly. Mr. Ryan was told by the receiver about 
the hearing at which approval of a sale would be sought, and Mr. Ryan did 
not appear or object. Defendants knew about the sale to Mrs. Fields, yet 
made no effort to discover the details. Defendants accepted the benefits of 
that sale without objecting. The district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it concluded that Defendants failure to object to the Sale Order was 
not the result of /1 excusable neglect." 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
Defendants did not have a meritorious defense. Unless the district court 
lacked jurisdiction, Defendants must also show that they had a 
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meritorious defense." Defendants have offered no defense to the actual 
sale of the Companies' assets. There is no dispute that Mrs. Fields offer 
was the best and highest offer based on arms' length negotiations that 
resulted in a commercially reasonable sale. Even now, Defendants say 
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their only objection is to the standard release provision, but this is not a 
meritorious objection. There is no doubt the district court would have 
approved the sale even if Defendants had objected to this provision-and 
would have been correct to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 60(b) offers parties a narrow path for escaping a final order or 
judgment: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
1n furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ... ; (3) fraud 
... ; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, discharged, or a prior judgment on which it is based 
has been reversed, or otherwise vacated ... ; (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
Defendants contend (1) that the judgment is void under 60(b)(4) 
because the district court lost jurisdiction when TAB filed its Notice of 
Voluntary Dismissal; (2) the continuation of the proceedings after the 
attempted withdrawal of Defendants' counsel is a /1 reason justifying relief 
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from the judgment" under 60(b)(6); and (3) Defendants' failure to object to 
the sale was the result of" excusable neglect" under 60(b)(l). None of these 
arguments has merit. 
The jurisdictional issue is reviewed de novo. See State Dept. of Social 
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). The district court is granted 
substantial deference on the other two issues. /1 [T]he standard of review 
for the denial of [a Rule 60(b)] motion focuses heavily on the highly 
discretionary nature of such a decision." Asset Acceptance LLC v. Stocks, 
2016 UT App 84, if 11. "The district court judge is vested with considerable 
discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion to set aside a 
judgment." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). /1 A district court 
abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the logic of the 
circumstances and so arbitrary and umeasonable as to shock one's sense of 
justice . . . or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v. 
Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, if 27 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Because of this broad discretion, /1 the outcome of rule 60(b) 
motions are rarely vulnerable to attack." Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, i-f 7. 
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I. The district court did not lose jurisdiction when TAB attempted to 
voluntarily dismiss the case. 
Defendants' first argument is that the judgment is void because the 
district court automatically lost jurisdiction when TAB filed a Notice of 
Voluntary Dismissal on November 24, 2014. "A judgment is void under 
rule 60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject 
matter or parties .... " Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, 2012 UT 6, ii 18 
(quotation marks omitted). 
A. Defendants responded to the complaint, making Rule 41(a)(l) 
ina pp lica b le. 
Rule 41(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to dismiss the action without a court 
order only "before service by the adverse party of an answer or other 
response to the complaint permitted under these rules." Utah R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1) (emphasis added). Once a defendant has filed "an answer or other 
response," an order from the court is required. Defendants contend that 
TAB' s attempted dismissal was effective because they had not filed an 
"answer or other response" to TAB' s complaint. 
But they had. In response to the complaint, on November 4, 2014, 
Defendants' counsel, Mark James, filed a notice of appearance. 
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Additionally, the third cause of action in TAB' s complaint sought the 
appointment of a receiver. In response to the complaint, Defendants' 
counsel appeared at a hearing and contested the appointment of a receiver. 
(R.432-33.) And in response to TAB's third claim for relief requesting that a 
receiver be appointed, Defendants filed an objection and proposed changes 
to the proposed order appointing the receiver. (R.525-026.) Defendants' 
counsel then appeared at a hearing to argue over the objections to the 
proposed order. (R.662.) This was all in "response to the complaint" as 
contemplated by Rule 41(a). 
Defendants also responded to the complaint by filing a stipulated 
motion to allow intervention. (R.422-23.) Intervention was sought "as of 
right" under Rule 24(a). By stipulating to intervention, Defendants 
acknowledged that Intervenors had "an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action" as set forth in the complaint. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a). Thus, the stipulation to allow intervention was very 
much a "response" to the allegations in the complaint. 
Defendants suggest that these are not the type of "responses" 
required by Rule 41(a)(1). But Rule 41(a)(1) says "response" not "pleading" 
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as that term is used in Rule 7. And one reason Rule 41 cuts off the 
plaintiff's right to unilaterally dismiss a complaint when the defendant has 
filed an answer "or other response" is that many responses besides an 
answer require the defendant to incur costs and fees, and the plaintiff 
should not be able to unilaterally cut off the defendants right to seek 
recovery of costs and fees. 
In short, a plaintiff cannot unilaterally dismiss a case if a "response" 
to the complaint has been filed. TAB responded to the complaint in several 
filings-not an answer or a motion to dismiss, but Rule 41(a)(1) does not 
require such a response. Thus, Rule 41(a)(1) was inapplicable when TAB 
attempted to unilaterally dismiss the entire case. 
B. The appointment of a receiver made Rule 41(a)(1) 
inapplicable by making it impossible for dismissal to occur 
without a court order. 
Over Defendants' objection, a receiver was appointed and instructed 
to "immediately ... take possession, custody, and control of the business 
and all of the assets of ... the Companies .... " (R.664.) The receiver was 
given broad authority over the Companies and their assets-essentially 
taking full control of the day-to-day operation of the Companies. (R.664-
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68.) The receiver was instructed to file and serve upon the parties within 
30 days an initial written report and then monthly reports thereafter /1 of 
operations reflecting income and expense, and including a summary of fees 
and administrative costs and expenses of Receiver and other professionals 
employed by Receiver .... " (R.670.) And all of the Receiver's fees and 
expenses had to be /1 submitted to the Court for approval and confirmation" 
to be paid out of the Companies' assets. (R.671.) 
All of this made it impractical, if not impossible, for the receiver to be 
discharged without oversight and approval from the district court. The 
district court would have to receive a report of what actions the receiver 
had taken during his appointment, how those actions had affected the 
Companies, and what effect termination of the receivership would have. 
At the very least, the court would have to approve payment of the 
receiver's costs and fees out of the Companies' assets. If Defendants are 
correct that the district court immediately lost jurisdiction when the Notice 
of Dismissal was filed, then the receiver would not be able to submit a final 
accounting and receive authorization of payment. 
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Additionally, the order appointing the receiver specifically states the 
conditions upon which he would be discharged: 
Receiver shall relinquish possession and control of the 
Companies and the Assets upon: (1) entry of an Order from this 
Court discharging Receiver from his duties; (2) upon the sale of 
substantially all of the Assets, pending approval of Receiver's 
final account and report to the Court; (3) a stipulation executed 
by all of the parties to this Action requesting that the Receiver 
relinquish possession and control of the Companies and the 
Assets; or (4) upon the Receiver filing a petition with the Court 
resigning his position [as] Receiver. 
(R.675.) The order adds: "Receiver or the parties to this Action may at any 
time apply to this Court for any further orders, or relief, including an order 
to terminate the receivership .... " (R.675-76.) None of these conditions 
were met by TAB's Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. 
Finally, Utah law makes it clear that the court, not the parties, 
controls the discharge of a receivership. In Shaw v. Robison, 537 P.2d 487 
(Utah 1975), the plaintiff and defendant were equal owners of a 
corporation. When differences arose between them, one sued the other and 
moved for the appointment of a receiver. A receiver was appointed. "The 
two parties later settled their difficulties and jointly moved the court to 
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terminate the receivership." Id. at 488. The court denied their motion 
allowing the receivership to continue, even though the parties had settled 
their dispute. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed because the termination 
of a receivership is within the court's sole control and requires the court to 
consider the interests of all parties, which in this case would include the 
Intervenors: 
A receivership is an equitable matter and is entirely 
within the control of the court. The fact that the parties 
requested a termination of the matter in the midst of the 
proceedings does not compel the court to "about face" and 
cease all matters instanter. 
In determining whether to continue a receivership or 
discharge the receiver the court will consider the rights and 
interests of all parties concerned, and will not grant an 
application for discharge merely because it is made by the party 
at whose instance the appointment was made. 
Id. at 490 (internal citation omitted). 
In other words, the court-not the parties-controls the discharge of 
a receiver. And once a receiver is appointed, the party that sought the 
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appointment cannot unilaterally discharge the receiver, which would be 
the effect of a Rule 41(a)(l) dismissal.2 
In this case, the district court was within its right to refuse to 
terminate the receivership. The receiver had taken over control of the 
companies. Such an abrupt termination without court oversight could 
have prejudiced the Intervenors or others, and might have had serious 
consequences to the Companies. And, again, at the very least, the court 
needed receive a report from the receiver and a final accounting of costs 
and fees. In short, once a receiver was appointed, Rule 41(a)(l) no longer 
allows the plaintiff who requested and received appointment of the 
receiver to unilaterally terminate the case and, thereby, the receivership. 
C. Intervention made Rule 41(a)(1) inapplicable. 
The third reason that Rule 41(a)(l) was inapplicable when TAB 
attempted to terminate this case is that the Intervenors had joined the case. 
Defendants concede that "[i]f a case has multiple plaintiffs, one plaintiff 
2 Defendants point out that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
rules of some states expressly prohibit dismissal under Rule 41(a)(l) once a 
receiver has been appointed. Aplt. Br. at 24. These rules merely make 
express what is already the inherent result of the appointment of a receiver. 
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cannot terminate the whole case by a notice or stipulation of dismissal." 
(R.1215.) Defendants assert that TAB "was the only plaintiff" when it filed 
the notice of voluntary dismissal. Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendants do not ignore 
the presence of the Intervenors, they argue that (1) the Intervenors did not 
file a pleading as required by Rule 24(c) and therefore were not "parties" in 
the case, and (2) even if Intervenors were parties, they had not been 
identified as plaintiffs. Neither argument is persuasive. 
A plaintiff can dismiss a case under Rule 41(a)(1) "during the 
pend ency of a motion to intervene" because "the proposed intervenors do 
not become parties within the meaning of [Rule 41(a)] until their motion is 
granted." 8 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 41.34[4][b] 
(3d ed. 20313). But the calculation changes once the motion to intervene is 
granted. The intervenor "becomes a full participant in the lawsuit and is 
treated just as if it were an original party." Alvarado v. J.C. Penney Co., 997 
F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Coal of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable 
Econ. Growth v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) ("If a 
party has the right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), the intervenor becomes 
no less a party than others and has the right to file legitimate motions .... "). 
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And there is a /1 strong policy . . . not to allow the original parties in an 
action to effectively eliminate an intervenor's claims when that intervenor 
has been made a party to the action as a matter of right." Steiner v. County 
of Marshall, 568 N.W.2d 627, 635 (S.D. 1997). 
Defendants argue that the Intervenors did not properly intervene 
because they "never filed a pleading as Rule 24 requires, and therefore 
never established themselves as plaintiffs." Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendants are 
wrong for two reasons: First, viewed properly, what Defendants are 
appealing is the trial court's decision to allow intervention in the first place. 
But Defendants stipulated to intervention without objecting to the absence 
of a pleading and are therefore prohibited from arguing that the order 
allowing intervention was in error. /1 [A] party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing 
the error." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ii 17 (quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants will argue that their stipulation is irrelevant because 
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated to. But that puts the cart before the horse. 
TAB' s attempted dismissal deprived the court of jurisdiction only if 
intervention was improper. And because Defendants stipulated to 
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intervention without objecting to the absence of a pleading, they cannot 
object now that intervention was improper. Because intervention was 
proper, the Intervenors became full-fledged parties to the case.3 
But even if Defendants did not waive their argument that 
intervention was improper because the intervenors did not file a pleading, 
abundant case law establishes that the failure to file a pleading 1s a 
technical defect that should be overlooked in the absence of prejudice. "An 
intervenor's failure to comply with the requirement for filing a pleading is 
a purely technical defect which does not result in the disregard of any 
substantial rights." 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 184. As a prominent 
treatise states: "If the intervenor is content to stand on the pleading an 
existing party has filed, it is difficult to see what is accomplished by adding 
to the papers in the case a new pleading that is identical in its allegations 
3 Numerous courts have held unilateral voluntary dismissal under Rule 
41(a) is not allowed after intervention by additional parties. See Wheeler v. 
Am. Home Prod. Corp., 582 F.2d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that Rule 
41(a)(1) does not authorize dismissal of the entire case by the original 
plaintiff where intervening plaintiffs did not consent); Univ. of South 
Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 178 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
attempted notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) was ineffective 
where "it was by no means clear that the proper plaintiff" filed the notice). 
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with one that is already in the file." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure,§ 1914 (3d ed. 2009). 
In Barnes v. Harris, 783 F.3d 1185, (10th Cir. 2015), the FDIC 
intervened in an action filed in state court and then, without having filed a 
pleading, removed the case to federal court based on a statute conferring 
federal jurisdiction over any case in which the FDIC was a "party." The 
plaintiff objected that the FDIC could not be a party without having filed a 
pleading. The Tenth Circuit rejected that argument. "Treating an 
intervening entity as a party even if that entity has not filed a pleading is 
consonant with the Federal Rules." Id. at 1191. See also Alvarado, 997 F.2d 
at 805 (intervenor did not file a pleading but was still considered "a full 
participant in the lawsuit" and had to be treated "just as if it were an 
original party"). This same permissiveness has been followed in numerous 
jurisdictions. See United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 
834 (8th Cir. 2009) (intervenor "did not submit a pleading" but its motion 
to intervene" satisfied Rule 24(c) because it provides sufficient notice to the 
court and the parties of MIEC' s interests"); United States v. State of Louisiana, 
543 F.2d 1125, 1128 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to file complaint with motion 
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to intervene "did not prejudice the parties" where intervenor's interest was 
clear). 
In sum, courts do not require parties to "comply strictly with the 
requirements of Rule 24(c)," but rather, "the proper approach is to 
disregard non-prejudicial technical defects." Spring Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Harris, 614 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that failure to file a 
pleading was not fatal where petition to intervene and accompanying 
affidavit "set forth sufficient facts and allegations to apprise Spring of 
LITC's claims"); see also Mass. v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1236 n.19 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ("procedural defects in connection with intervention 
motions should generally be excused by a court") (quotation marks 
omitted). 
One more case solidifies the point. In Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Mendez, 585 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2009), Northwest Airlines obtained a $10 
million default judgment against Phil Mendez. Mendez never notified his 
insurer, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, about the claim. When 
Westchester was notified, it filed a declaratory judgment action asking the 
court to declare that no coverage existed. Northwest intervened in that 
17 
lawsuit for the obvious reason of arguing that there was coverage so that it 
could collect its judgment from the proceeds of the insurance policy. But 
Northwest never filed a pleading. Mendez failed to answer an amended 
complaint and, over Northwest's objection, a default judgment was entered 
declaring that no coverage existed. 
Northwest appealed. Westchester argued on appeal that "because 
Northwest did not file an answer or a complaint and did not adopt any 
pleading filed by another party, it had no interest to assert." Id. at 1888. 
The court said this argument was "both inconsistent with precedent and 
lacking in logic." Id. "Northwest's interest is obvious," the court 
explained, 
It wants to be able to collect its judgment against Mendez from 
the Westchester insurance policy and it cannot do that if 
Westchester is not liable under that policy. That interest was 
explicitly identified in Northwest's motion to intervene .... The 
district court recognized Northwest's interest, and it granted 
the motion to intervene. 
Id. The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though Northwest had 
not filed a pleading, the district court erred in granting default judgment 
against the named defendant and dismissing the case. 
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Likewise, in this case, Intervenors' interest was obvious: a receiver 
had been appointed to take control of the collateral that secured their loans 
to Defendants. The Intervenors wanted to get paid. Defendants obviously 
recognized this interest when they stipulated to the intervention, and the 
court recognized it when it granted the motion to intervene. As in 
Westchester, Defendants in this case "offer[ ] no substantive argument that 
[Intervenors] do[ ] not have an actual interest." Id. They" simply seek[ ] to 
capitalize on [Intervenors'] failure to file a pleading .... " Id. But the 
"failure to comply with the Rule 24(c) requirement for a pleading is a 
'purely technical' defect which does not result in the 'disregard of any 
substantial right."' Id. (quoting Shores v. Hendy Realization Co., 133 F.2d 738, 
742 (9th Cir. 1943).4 
This leads to Defendants last argument, which is that even if 
intervention was proper, Intervenors had not identified themselves as 
4 The federal court cases cited in this section obviously are not controlling, 
but Utah's appellate courts "recognize the persuasiveness of federal 
interpretations when state and federal rules are similar and few Utah cases 
deal with the rule in question." Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 
1039 n.5 (Utah 1994). 
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plaintiffs and, therefore, TAB was still the only one plaintiff and could 
unilaterally dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1). This argument also fails. 
Intervenors quite obviously intervened as plaintiffs. They supported 
TAB in its efforts to have a receiver appointed. And there is no conceivable 
reason why they would have intervened as defendants in an action filed by 
TAB. Finally, any possible confusion was clarified when Defendants 
stipulated that Intervenors were plaintiffs in the case and could continue to 
pursue the third cause of action in TAB's complaint. (R.780, R.1453.) 
The failure to attach a pleading is a technical defect that "may easily 
be resolved." Diagnostic Devices, Inc. v. Taidoc Technology Corp., 257 F.R.D. 
96, 101 (W.D.N.C. 2009). It was easily resolved in this case. In fact, 
Defendants stipulated that Intervenors were plaintiffs and that they could 
adopt the third cause of action in TAB' s complaint. That stipulation 
resolved any technical defects. 
Plaintiffs support their position with Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 
56, where this court explained that when Rule 41(a)(1) is "properly" 
invoked the action becomes "'a nullity' -it is as though 'the action had 
never been brought"' and the court "would lack jurisdiction to proceed any 
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further with the action." Id. ii 24 (quoting Barton v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 
P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1994). But this only shows why Rule 41(a)(l) was not 
"properly" invoked in this case. By the time TAB attempted to invoke Rule 
41(a)(l), Defendants had responded to the complaint by entering an 
appearance and opposing the appointment of the receiver; Defendants had 
stipulated to allowing several additional parties to intervene; and the 
receiver had been appointed and had assumed control over Defendants' 
businesses and assets. A simple voluntary notice of dismissal could not 
render all of this a "nullity" - and especially not the appointment of a 
receiver, for the reasons explained. 
At most, TAB's notice of voluntary dismissal was effective only as to 
TAB's claims, but not as to the interests of the Intervenors. Rule 41(a)(l) 
permits dismissal of less than an entire action, '"whether it is fewer than all 
the defendants against whom a dismissal is sought to be taken, or fewer 
than all the plaintiffs who seek to withdraw from the action."' Pedrina v. 
Chun, 987 F.2d 608, 610 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Moore's Fed. Prac. ii 
41.06-1 (2d ed. 1992)). And this is precisely what the end result was in this 
case. In fact, it is what Defendants stipulated to. 
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In sum, TAB's attempted dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) was 
ineffective, at least as to Intervenors, because: (1) Defendants had 
responded to the complaint; (2) a receiver had been appointed and could 
only be discharged by an order from the court; and (3) TAB was not the 
only plaintiff in the case and had no right to dismiss the interests of the 
Intervenors. 
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reverse 
the judgment based on the attempted withdrawal of Defendants' 
counsel. 
Defendants next argue that the attempted withdrawal of their 
counsel and Intervenors' failure to send notice to Defendants of the need to 
retain new counsel provides a /1 reason justifying relief from the judgment" 
under 60(b)(6). The district court considered all of the circumstances and 
refused to reverse the judgment for this reason. That decision was far from 
an abuse of discretion. See Jones, 2009 UT 39, if 27. 
To withdraw without an order from the court, an attorney must serve 
on all parties a notice of withdrawal that /1 shall include the address of the 
attorney's client[s] and a statement that no motion is pending and no 
hearing or trial date has been set." Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c). The trial court 
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found that the Notice of Withdrawal "was defective, and therefore 
ineffective, because it did not include Defendants' address(es)." (R.1458.) 
"This is not a mere technicality," the court explained, "because the address 
requirement is directly tied to the other parties' ability to comply with the 
notice to appear or appoint requirement and to communicate with 
Defendants during this critical period of time."5 (R.1458.) 
Additionally, it was undisputed that Defendants' counsel "continued 
to receive electronic notice of all pending motions and hearings as required 
by the rules" and there is "no evidence that Defendants did not receive 
actual notice of the Expedited Motion, the December 23rd hearing, and the 
Order of Sale or that Mr. James did not keep Defendants apprised of the 
proceedings in this case." (R.1458.) In fact, there is indisputable evidence 
that Defendants did receive actual notice of the ongoing proceedings, 
including the sale to Mrs. Fields. The receiver told the court at the hearing 
to approve the sale that Mr. Ryan has "been in communication with the 
5 The notice of withdrawal was also "ineffective," the court said, "because 
the Expedited Motion was filed the same day," and the essentially 
"contemporaneous filing of the Motion to Expedite resulted in [a] pending 
motion that precluded counsel for Defendants from withdrawing without 
an order of the Court." (R.1459.) 
23 
receiver ... so he does know that this was coming down today." (R.1500.) 
Further, Defendants were obviously aware of the sale because they referred 
to it in their complaint against Mrs. Fields Franchising in the Ohio 
litigation. (R.1045-46.) And at the hearing on their motion to set aside the 
judgment, Defendants conceded that they learned about the Sale Order and 
the termination of the receivership in January 2015. "And yet they took no 
action to object for approximately two months," the district court 
explained. (R.1046.) 
"By failing to object when the first learned of the Order of Sale and by 
accepting the benefits flowing from it, Defendants waived any rule 74 
objection." (R.1046.) And such an objection can be waived. See Migliore v. 
Migliore, 2008 UT App 208, 8if8if 16-19. 
Finally, even if Defendants' counsel properly withdrew, the 
moratorium is not unbreakable. No further proceedings are allowed until 
21 days after the notice to appear or appoint counsel is filed "unless 
otherwise ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c). In this case, the 
court decided to move forward. 
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In fact, in this case a moratorium was effectively impossible. A 
receiver had been appointed and had taken control of the Companies. The 
trial court could not simply put the receivership on hold; it had to keep 
supervising the receiver's work. And time was of the essence. As the 
receiver told the court when asking it to approve the sale, the ice cube was 
melting. The perishable assets at issue were perishing. (R.1502.) "[W]e do 
need to strike quickly," the receiver said. (R.1502.) The district court 
agreed and approved the sale. 
And the district court was well within its powers of supervision over 
the receivership to approve the sale even in the absence of Defendants. 
"The receiver is an officer and arm of the court and acts under the direction 
and supervision of the court," not the parties. Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697 
P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1985). 
A receiver has, under the direction of the court, the power to 
take and keep possession of property and generally do such 
acts respecting the property as the court may authorize. The 
possession by the court of the res in a receivership proceeding 
gives the court the power to determine all questions concerning 
the ownership and disposition of the property. 
Id. at 239-40. 
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Additional facts make the district court's approval of the sale even 
more appropriate, even though Defendants did not appear at the hearing 
where approval was given. Defendants had stated on the record that they 
trusted the receiver and said they "will approve" approve the sale to BBX 
or to anyone else who made a "better offer." (R.1452.) It is undisputed that 
the offer from Mrs. Fields was a far better offer, and the receiver told the 
district court he didn't expect a better offer. This, plus the fact that time 
was of the essence, makes it clear that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
Plus, Defendants accepted the benefits of this sale without any 
objection. And Defendants have never argued that the sale was not 
"commercially reasonable" or was not in the best interests of the 
receivership. Instead, Defendants object only to a single provision in the 
sale agreement-a standard release provision-because it negatively 
affected their efforts to file a separate lawsuit. They do not dispute that the 
offer that was accepted was the best for the receivership estate. 
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For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when 
it refused to set aside the judgment based on the attempted withdrawal of 
Defendants' counsel. 
III. Defendants did not exercise due diligence - they exercised no 
diligence. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
found that Defendants failure to object to the Sale Order was not 
the result of "excusable neglect." 
Defendants' final argument is that their failure to object to the sale 
was the result of" excusable neglect." See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l). "A trial 
court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown excusable 
neglect, and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there 
has been an abuse of discretion." Cadlerock joint Venture II LP v. Envelope 
Packaging of Utah Inc., 2011 UT App 98, ,-r 9 (quotation marks, ellipsis, and 
brackets omitted). 
Excusable neglect requires "the exercise of due diligence by a 
reasonably prudent person under the circumstances." Asset Acceptance 
LLC, 2016 UT App 84, ,-r 16 (quotation marks omitted). 
While a party need not be perfectly diligent in order to obtain 
relief, some diligence is necessary in order for the neglect to be 
considered excusable. In determining whether a party has 
exercised due diligence, the district court must consider 
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whether the actions of the party seeking relief were sufficiently 
diligent and responsible, 1n light of the attendant 
circumstances, to justify excusing it from the full consequences 
of its neglect. 
Id. (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted). In other 
words, excusable neglect exists "where the failure to act was the result of 
... the neglect one would expect from a reasonably prudent person under 
similar circumstances." Sewell v. Xpress Lube, 2013 UT 61, if 29 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants' neglect is the opposite of what one would have expected 
under the circumstances of this case. Defendants knew the receiver was 
actively trying to sell the Companies' assets. They knew an offer had been 
received. In fact, they had approved that offer. Yet, they consented to their 
attorney withdrawing and then did nothing. They made no discernible 
effort to follow what was happening. Mr. Ryan was told that a hearing 
was being held to approve the sale of the Companies' assets, and yet he 
took no action on his own behalf or on behalf of the Companies. The only 
conclusion that can be drawn is that Defendants simply did not care about 
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the details of the sale until a minute detail- the release - came back to bite 
them. 
The trial court carefully considered "the particular circumstances of 
this case" and "all relevant factors" and concluded that "Defendants have 
not shown that they exercised sufficient diligence .... " (R.1455.) 
Defendants knew that Receiver had been appointed, BBX had 
made an offer, and timing was an issue given the nature of the 
inventory and the upcoming holiday season. Based on their 
counsel's statements at the December 3rd hearing, Defendants 
also knew the Receiver might receive other offers. Importantly, 
there is no evidence in the record that Defendants did not have 
actual notice of the Expedited Motion or the Notice of Hearing 
or the proposed Order of Sale.[6] It is undisputed that all of the 
relevant pleadings and notices were served on Mr. James. Mr. 
Ryan never testifies that Mr. James did not provide him with 
copies of these pleadings and notices. Instead, Mr. Ryan 
testifies that he did not see the Asset Purchase Agreement before 
the Court entered the Order of Sale on December 23, 2014. 
There is also evidence in the record that Mr. Ryan was 1n 
communication with the Receiver during this period of time. 
(R.1455.) 
6 In fact, as we have shown, Defendants had specific notice of the pending 
sale to Mrs. Fields. The Receiver testified at the hearing to approve the sale 
that he had been in contact with Mr. Ryan "so he does know that this was 
coming down today." (R.1500.) 
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Defendants note that the Companies could not appear without 
counsel, but the trial court rejected that argument because there was 
"nothing that prevented [Mr. Ryan] from attending the hearing [on 
December 23, 2014] and alerting the Court to Defendants' concerns about 
the proposed sale to Mrs. Fields .... " (R.1455.) The evidence shows that 
Defendants were unconcerned about the sale to Mrs. Fields "until they 
were confronted with the release language during the Ohio litigation filed 
months later." (R.1455.) "This, along with Defendants' acceptance of the 
beneficial aspects of the sale, does not support a finding that they acted in 
good faith." (R.1455-56.) 
In short, due diligence 1s determined by the circumstances. 
Defendants exercised no diligence. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it concluded that Defendants' failure to object was the 
result of excusable neglect. 
IV. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that 
Defendants did not have a meritorious defense. 
Finally, Plaintiffs also have to show that they had a meritorious 
defense. "Mere proof of surprise or excusable neglect would be insufficient 
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without some assertion of a meritorious defense ... as it would be an empty 
formality to set aside a default judgment for a defendant who had no 
chance of prevailing on the merits." Judson, 2012 UT 6, i-f 14. In this case, 
the district court concluded that even if Defendants had retained new 
counsel and timely objected to the sale to Mrs. Fields, their objection would 
have lacked merit and the court would have approved the sale anyway. 
(R.1456.) 
As the district court pointed out, Defendants' counsel expressed 
confidence in the receiver and approved of the offer from BBX or any other 
better offer. (R.1456.) A much better offer did come. In fact, the offer from 
Mrs. Fields was "nearly a million dollar increase" over the offer from BBX. 
(R.1501.) The district court held a hearing and concluded that the offer 
from Mrs. Fields was "the best and highest offer" and that "Defendants 
received significant benefits as a result" of the sale. (R.1456.) Additionally, 
the district court pointed out that Defendants said they would not have 
objected to the sale itself. In fact, Defendants have never contended that 
the sale was not an arm's-length, commercially-reasonable sale. They have 
objected only to one provision that affected only them-the release that 
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prevented their attempt to sue Mrs. Fields in Ohio. The district court said 
it was "not persuaded that an objection to one provision of an otherwise 
unobjectionable Asset Purchase Agreement is a 'meritorious defense"' and 
that it would not have rejected the sale to Mrs. Fields "because of an 
objection to the release language, particularly when the claim that 
Defendants want to assert against Mrs. Fields is a claim that was an asset of 
the receivership and was arguably being sold to either BBX or Mrs. Fields." 
(R.1456.) 
The district court's determination that Defendants did not present a 
meritorious defense was not an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' arguments on appeal can be broken into two parts: 
Defendants first argument is that after TAB's Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal, the district court lacked jurisdiction. This argument, as 
Defendants correctly point out, is subject to de nova review and does not 
require Defendants to show a "meritorious defense" in addition to the lack 
of jurisdiction. But this argument fails on the merits. Rule 41(a)(1) was 
inapplicable when TAB filed its Notice of Voluntary Dismissal for several 
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independent reasons: (1) Defendants had responded to the complaint by 
entering an appearance through counsel, stipulating to intervention, and 
opposing the appointment of a receiver; (2) Rule 41(a)(1) became 
inapplicable when the court appointed a receiver because only the court 
could discharge the receiver; and (3) Defendants had stipulated to 
intervention, and the Intervenors were plaintiffs whose interest could not 
be dismissed by TAB. All three reasons provide an independent basis to 
affirm. Thus, even under de nova review, the district court's determination 
that TAB' s attempted dismissal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction 
should be affirmed. 
The second part of Defendants' appeal is even weaker because it is 
subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. District courts "have 
'broad discretion' in deciding whether to set aside a judgment" under Rule 
60(b) for non-jurisdictional reasons. Jones, 2009 UT 39, ii 17. "A district 
court abuses its discretion only when its decision was against the logic of 
the circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's 
sense of justice or resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Id. ii 27 
(internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). And the district 
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court plainly did not abuse its discretion in this case. It exercised proper 
authority over the receivership and was well within its rights to approve 
the sale. It was the best offer the receiver could hope for, and time was of 
the essence. And Defendants were simply unconcerned with the details. 
Bank of American Fork respectfully asks this Court to affirm the 
decision of the district court. 
DATED this ~day of June, 2016. 
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